Abstract Recent approaches to the analysis of crypto-protocols build on concepts which are well-established in the eld of process algebras, such as labelled transition systems (lts) and observational semantics. We outline some recent work in this direction that stems from using cryptographic versions of the pi-calculus { most notably Abadi and Gordon's spi-calculus { as protocol description languages. We show the impact of these approaches on a speci c example, a simpli ed version of the Kerberos protocol.
INTRODUCTION
Recent approaches to the analysis of crypto-protocols build on a few concepts which are well-established in the eld of process algebras, such as labelled transition systems (lts) and observational semantics. We outline here some recent work in this direction that stems from the use of cryptographic versions of the pi-calculus 10] { most notably Abadi and Gordon's spi-calculus 2, 1] { as protocol description languages. We show the impact of these approaches on a speci c example, a simpli ed version of the Kerberos protocol 8].
A major line of research is centered around the notion of observational equivalence, which permits making such notions as`attacker' and secrecy' rigorous. For instance, according to 2], a way of asserting that a protocol, represented by a process term P(d), keeps datum d secret is requiring that P(d) be equivalent to P(d 0 ), for every other d 0 . Observational equivalences based on context-closure, like may-testing 6, 3, 2] and barbed equivalence 11], appear to be appropriate in this setting. The intuition behind them is precisely that no external context (which 1 in the present setting can be read as`attacker') may notice any di erence when running in parallel with P(d 0 ) or P(d). The de nitions of these equivalences, while rigorous and intuitive, su er from universal quanti cation over contexts (attackers) , that makes equivalence checking very hard. We have shown in previous work 4] how to avoid such quanti cation and obtain more tractable characterizations. The latters are based on an`environment-sensitive' lts (as opposed to the`standard' lts, which only explains process intentions). The states of this lts are con gurations P, where P is a process and represents the current environment's knowledge about names and keys. The moves of the process are constrained by this knowledge. Trace equivalence and weak bisimilarity are de ned on top of this lts, and proven to be in agreement with may-testing and barbed equivalence, respectively. A major advantage of the new equivalences is represented by the congruence laws that make compositional reasoning on protocols possible. In this paper, we use bisimilarity and related compositional laws to formalize and verify a few security properties of a key-exchange protocol, inspired by the simpli ed version of Kerberos in 5]. The veri cation implies establishing a few process equalities that, we believe, would be hard to prove if one relied on the original, contextual de nitions.
Another line of research based on environment-sensitive lts' relies on the analysis of the traces a protocol can execute, to nd out whether any`insecure' state (one, e.g., in which some con dential information has been passed to the environment) can ever be reached. The resulting method is less amenable to compositional reasoning, but seems wellsuited for mechanization. We hint at some ongoing work (by one of us in collaboration with Martin Abadi and Marcelo Fiore), indicating that a full automation of the method can be achieved by considering a symbolic version of the environment-sensitive lts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the language, the environment-sensitive lts and bisimilarity. Section 3 presents a number of properties of bisimilarity, mainly compositional proof rules. These rules are exploited in Section 4, to analyze a simpli ed version of Kerberos. The trace analysis of the protocol, based on a symbolic version of the lts, is touched upon in Section 5. A few concluding remarks are reported in Section 6.
THE LANGUAGE
In this section, we introduce syntax, operational semantics and bisimilarity for our language.
Syntax
The syntax of the calculus is summarized in Table 1 . Names can be used as communication channels, primitive data or encryption keys: we do not distinguish between these three kinds of objects (notationally, we prefer letters h; k; : : : ; when we want to stress the use of a name as a key). Messages are obtained from names either via pairing or via shared-key encryption. In particular, message fMg k represents the ciphertext obtained by encrypting message M under key k, using a shared-key encryption system. Encryptions can be arbitrarily nested. Expressions are obtained applying encryption, decryption, pairing and projection operators to names and ciphertexts. For example, the result of evaluating dec ( ) is the text obtained by decrypting the ciphertext using the value of as a key. Logical formulae generalize the usual equality operator of the -calculus with a predicate name( ), which tests for the format of the argument (plain name or a compound ciphertext), and with a`let' construct that binds the value of some expression to a name z. Processes are built using a set of operators which include those from the standard -calculus, plus two new operators: boolean guard and encryption/decryption.
An informal explanation of the operators might be the following: 0 is the process that does nothing; (x):P represents input of a generic message x along : the only useful case is when is a name, otherwise the whole process is stuck; :P represents output of along : the only useful case is when is a name and is a message, otherwise the whole process is stuck; P + Q can behave either as P or Q: the choice might either be triggered by the environment, or by internal computations of P or Q; P jQ is the parallel execution of P and Q; ( a) P creates a new name a which is only known to P; ! P behaves like unboudedly many copies of P running in parallel, i.e. P j P j P j ; P behaves like P if the formula is logically true, otherwise it is stuck; let z = in P attempts evaluation of : if the evaluation succeeds the result is bound to z within P, otherwise the whole process is stuck.
We shall often abbreviate ( a) ( b) P as ( a; b) P. Notions of free names of a process P, f n(P), of bound names of P, bn(P ), and of alpha-equivalence arise as expected; n(P ) is f n(P) bn(P ). Often, we shall write f n(P; Q) in place of f n(P) f n(Q) (similarly for bn( ) and n( )). Similar notations are used for formulae, expressions and messages. From now on, we shall identify alpha-equivalent terms.
A substitution is a nite partial map from N to the set of messages M. The domain and proper co-domain of are written dom( ) and range( ), respectively. We let n( ) = dom( ) ( M2range( ) n(M)). The operational semantics is de ned by the inference rules of Table 2. All rules in the rst part of the table, but the last two, are standard from -calculus. Rule (Guard) says that process P behaves like P provided that evaluates to true; otherwise, process P is stuck.
Rule (Let) attempts evaluation of expression : if the evaluation succeeds, then process let z = in P behaves like process P b =z], otherwise let z = in P is stuck.
The rules in the upper part of Table 2 only account for process intentions. The rules in the lower part of the table build on those in the upper part, and account for interaction with the environment. They dene an environment-sensitive lts whose states are con gurations of the form P, where P is a process and substitution represents the environment (from now on, terms`substitution' and`environment' will be used interchangeably). Transitions take the form P j ??! 0 P 0 and represent atomic interactions between process P and environment , is the process action and is a corresponding environment action. Process actions, ranged over by , can be of three forms: (internal action), a hMi (input at a where message M is received), and ( e b) ahMi (output at a where message M containing the fresh, private names e b is sent). We shall write ahMi instead of ( e b) ahMi whenever e b = ;. Environment actions, ranged over by , can be of three forms: ( e b) h i (output), (x) (input), and ? (no action). Free names and bound names of are de ned as expected, in particular bn( (x)) = fxg. Table 2 Operational semantics (symmetric of (Sum), ( Let us have a closer look at the rules of the environment-sensitive lts.
In rule (E-Out), the environment receives a message M and updates its knowledge accordingly. For the transition to take place, channel a must belong to the knowledge of the environment, thus is some expression describing how a can be obtained out of (this is what = a means).
In rule (E-Inp), the environment sends a message M to the process. Message M is not arbitrary: expression describes how it is built out of and of the names e b ( = M). 
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This logical characterization contains a quanti cation on all formulae.
In 4], we give an equivalent de nition that avoids explicitly considering all formulae and is amenable to automatic checking. However, the above de nition will su ce for the purposes of this paper. In the following, input and output actions will be called visible actions and we shall use s to range over sequences of visible process actions and u to range over sequences of visible environment actions. We write j = = ) to denote the re exive and transitive closure of j ??! ? and, inductively, We say that a pair of con gurations ( 1 P; 2 In 4], we prove that weak bisimilarity is in agreement with barbed equivalence ( =), a contextual process semantics. More precisely, weak bisimilarity is included in barbed equivalence: ( V ; V )`P Q implies P = Q, for any processes P and Q and V = f n(P; Q). The opposite Table 3 Basic properties of (Reflexivity) For any and P, ( ; )`P P.
(Transitivity) If ( 1 ; 2)`P Q and ( 2; 3 )`Q R then ( 1; 3 )`P R. (Struct-eq) Suppose that P Q. Then, for any , ( ; )`P Q.
inclusion holds only for the class of structurally image-nite processes (see 4]), a su ciently broad class of processes to ensure that is a fairly general proof technique.
COMPOSITIONAL REASONING
We discuss in this section a few laws which are very are useful for compositional reasoning on processes. Table 3 contains a few basic properties of , while Table 4 contains some congruence rules for . In Table 3 , denotes structural equivalence, which is de ned as the least equivalence relation over processes that is preserved by parallel composition and restriction, and satis es the structural laws of 9] plus the laws:
(let z = in P) P b =z] if b 6 = ? and
The next de nition formalizes the concept of decryption closure of an environment , written dc( ). Elements in dc( ) represent the basic knowledge derivable from , i.e. the \building blocks" the environment can use to synthesize more complex messages.
De nition 3.1 (decryption closure and knowledge) Let ( 1 ) and ( 1; 2 )`P Q :
(C-Res) Suppose that ( 1 ; 2)`P Q; that e k \ n ( 1) = ; and that e h \ n ( 2) = ; : Then ( 1 ; 2)`( e k) P ( e h) Q:
Note that both dc( ) and kn( ) are nite, and can be e ectively computed. The next proposition is useful when reasoning on the values a given expression can take on when evaluated under a substitution . Finally, we state a crucial compositionality result for , which strengthens the congruence rule for parallel composition (C-Par), under the assumption that the involved processes are \safe" for the appropriate environments, that is, they never increase the knowledge of these environments. Formally, we say that a process R is - 
THE KERBEROS PROTOCOL Speci cation
Consider a system where two agents A (the initiator) and B (the responder) share two long-term secret keys, k AS and k BS respectively, with a server S. The Kerberos protocol is designed to set up a new secret session key k AB between A and B. Below, we consider a slightly simplied version of this protocol, akin to that considered in 5]. Informally, the protocol can be described as follows: In message 1, A starts the protocol by simply communicating to S his intention to establish a new connection with B. In message 2, S generates a fresh key k AB and embodies it into an appropriate certi cate, which is sent to A. The certi cate uses a fresh nonce n S , that acts as a timestamp and is meant to assure A and B about the freshness of the message (this is to prevent attacks based on replays of old messages). In message 3,
A extracts B's part of the certi cate (f g k BS ) and forwards it to B, together with some challenge-information containing a new nonce n A . The fourth message represents a synchronization between A and B: the presence of n A assures A he is really talking to B.
Our intent here is to verify one run of the protocol, under the hypothesis that an old session key k has been compromised. We shall not consider the case of multiple runs, which requires a more complex analysis. For the sake of simplicity, we also suppose that the protocol is always started by A. In our language, the protocol translates to the process K de ned in Table 5 . For the sake of readability, we have used here and will be using in the sequel a few obvious notational shorthands. For example, a(fMg k ): P stands for a(x): let y = dec k (x) in y = M] P and x 6 2 fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g] stands for : x = a 1 ]^: : :^: x = a n ]. An expanded version of the protocol in Table 5 is reported below:
A def = cAShA; Bi: cAS(x1): let xn S = 1 (dec k AS (x1)); x k AB = 2 (dec k AS (x1)); xB = 3 (dec k AS (x1)); x 0 n S = 1 (dec k BS ( 4 (dec k AS (x1)))); x 0 k AB = 2 (dec k BS ( 4(deck AS (x1)))); xA = 3 (dec k BS ( 4 (dec k AS (x1)))) in xB = B; xn S = x 0 n S ; x k AB = x 0 k AB ; xA = A] cABhfxn S ; x k AB ; Ag k BS ; fA; nAgx k AB i: cAB(x2): x2 = fnAgx k AB ]: 0 B V def = cAB(y): let yn S = 1(deck BS ( 1(x1))); y k AB = 2 (dec k BS ( 1 (x1))); yA = 3(deck BS ( 1(x1))); y 0 A = 1 (decy k AB ( 2(x1))); yn A = 1 (decy k AB ( 2(x1) As usual, all bound names in K are assumed to be distinct from one another and from the free names. Subscripts should help reminding the expected values of each variable. For instance, the expected value for x certB is B's certi cate, i.e. fn S ; k AB ; Ag k BS . The lost-output action accounts for the accidental loss of an old session key k and of the corresponding certi cate for B, fn old ; k; Ag k BS . Set V contains all the past nonces generated by S: thus it is assumed that n old 2 V . Note that the freshness check on n S is performed by B in y n S = 2 V ] and then propagated to A, via the last synchronization on channel c AS .
There several properties that one might want to check of K. Here, we will just consider two of them. We formalize each property as a process and then check barbed equivalence ( =) between this process and K. In doing so, we partially follow Abadi and Gordon 2], but deviate from their presentation due to our use of an errorhi-action to explicitly signal violation of a property. Indeed, the notions of authentication and secrecy considered here are in some sense less demanding than those in 2], as we are not considering implicit information ow { which does not arise in this speci c example anyway.
Authentication: \B and A only accept the key k AB generated by S". Output at channel error is used to explicitly signal that a key di erent from k AB has been received by A or B. The fact that K and K aut are equivalent means that action errorhi, hence violation of authentication, never occurs.
Secrecy: \The key k AB is never revealed". Formally, it holds that K j E = K secr , where K secr is de ned below: Here E and E secr represent \eavesdroppers": each of them may at any time receive at e any message known to the environment. After doing so, E just remains silent, but E secr signals an errorhi if the received message happens to be k AB . The fact that K j E and K secr are equivalent means that action errorhi, hence violation of secrecy, never occurs.
Veri cation
In this section, we will prove the above authentication and secrecy by reasoning compositionally on processes. Let I def = f n(K; K aut ) (that is, I = flost; A; B; c AS ; c BS ; c AB ; k; errorg V ) and I 0 def = f n(K j E; K secr ) (that is, I 0 = feg I). By virtue of soundness of w.r.t. =, to establish authentication it will be su cient to prove that
(1) while, for secrecy, it will be su cient to establish that ( I 0; I 0)`K j E K secr : (2) Let M 0 be the message issued in the lost-action, and M i , i = 1; : : : ; 4 be the four messages exchanged in the protocol, that is, let us de ne: M 0 = hfn old ; k; Ag BS ; ki M 1 = hA; Bi M 2 = fn S ; k AB ; B; fn S ; k AB ; Ag k BS g k AS M 3 = hfn S ; k AB ; Ag k BS ; fA; n A g k AB i M 4 = fn A g k AB :
We also de ne We can now use (Weakening) so as to discard the w i -entries of , and then use (C-Res), with ( k AS ; k BS ; k AB ; n A ; n S ) , so as to get: ( I ; I )`( k AS ; k BS ; k AB ; n A ; n S ) (losthM 0 i: 0 j A j B V j S) ( k AS ; k BS ; k AB ; n A ; n S ) (losthM 0 i: 0 j A aut j B V aut j S) :
Applying repeatedly the structural equivalence axiom ( a) (P j Q) P j (( a) Q) if a = 2 f n(P), we can push each restriction onto the appropriate position, both in the RHS and LHS. By (Struct-eq) we get thus the wanted equality (1). So the proof reduces to establishing equations (3,4) above, and to proving that each of A, A aut , B V , B V aut , S and losthM 0 i: 0 is -safe.
This we do in detail below.
In the sequel, we shall write R(w) to indicate that name w may occur free in R, and, for any message M, we write R(M) in place of R M =w].
Equation ( The RHS of these two equalities are clearly bisimilar under e b = e b], because the mismatch-guarded output in the second expression ( k AB 6 = k AB ]errorhi: 0) is actually stuck. By (Struct-eq), we therefore get (6) for this case.
A and A aut are -safe. Consider A (the proof for A aut is the same).
The rst output action clearly does not violate -safety. Consider now the second output, that is consider the case when The crucial step is showing that: ( 0 ; 0 )`E E secr (9) and that E and E secr are 0 -safe. Otherwise, the proof proceeds like in the case of authentication. To prove (9), it will be su cient to use This analysis also shows that E secr is 0 -safe. Finally, E is trivially 0 -safe.
TRACE ANALYSIS
An alternative approach to the analysis of crypto-protocols is based on analyzing the sequences of actions (traces) executable by a given spicalculus speci cation. We brie y touch upon some ongoing work by Martin Abadi, Marcelo Fiore and one of us (M.B.) in this direction.
A sensible way of formalizing secrecy of the session key in our version of Kerberos, is requiring that action errorhi is never executed by the speci cation K secr : formally, for no s, u, , P and , it is the case that I K secr s j ==) u P errorhi j = ===== ) . Trace analysis is less amenable to compositional reasoning than equivalence-based analysis, but is wellsuited for mechanical checking. We discuss this below.
The presence of input actions causes any nontrivial process to be in nite-state, as each input variable can be instantiated to any of innitely many values (see rules (Inp) and (E-Inp) of Table 2 ). It is possible to avoid this kind of state-explosion by equipping spi-calculus with a symbolic operational semantics. Given a generic input-pre xed process a(x):R, the idea is to incrementally constrain the set of possible values x can take on, rather than to immediately instantiate x.
Constraints are expressed as uni ers. To see how this can be done, let us consider simpli ed versions of both con gurations and transitions: in fact, the`environment action' is not necessary anymore and the rst component of any con guration is assumed to be simply a trace of input/output actions. As an example, consider P In the second step, decryption of x with key k is resolved as uni cation of x with a term fx 0 g k , for a fresh x 0 . The resulting substitution ( fx 0 g k =x]) is propagated through the whole con guration, and causes the rst input action of the trace, a hxi, to be`re ned' into a hfx 0 It can be seen that the nal trace 0 is not consistent: this means that it cannot be instantiated to any concrete trace, i.e. a trace generable by the`concrete' operational semantics of Table 2 . In fact, it can be proven that no symbolic trace of K secr leading to errorhi is consistent in this sense. Thus, K secr will never execute errorhi. In general, it can be shown that consistency of symbolic traces can be e ectively decided.
CONCLUSIONS
We have outlined some recent approaches to the analysis of cryptoprotocols, centered around concepts derived from process algebras, such as labelled transition systems and observational semantics.
When compared to more traditional methods { like CSP-based model checking 7, 13] and theorem proving 12] { major bene ts of the equivalence-based approach seem to be a fully satisfactory formalization of many important properties (including implicit information ow), and compositional proof rules. Symbolic trace analysis appears to be similar in spirit to model checking, but it does not su er from the limitation of model checking, which requires the model to be`cut' to a suitable nite size, even in the presence of only a limited number of participants. On the other hand, both model checking and theorem proving have proven very e ective in practice in nding bugs of crypto-protocols. Real-life case studies are necessary to determine whether process algebraic approaches may represent a valid alternative to established techniques.
